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Commentary on the AMA Statement 
on Tube Feedings 
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D. 
Doctor Diamond, a professor of pediatrics, is affiliated with Loyola 
University Stritch School of Medicine. 
The ethical analysis provided by the Center for Health Care Ethics 
concerning the AMA statement on tube feedings, makes some important 
distinctions, but also raises some issues of concern. 
One important obligation is to define the specific population addressed 
by the AMA. The category of patients for whom the withholding of 
nutrition and hydration is recommended, consists of those in irreversible 
coma for whom death is not imminent. As AMA publications have further 
clarified, the statement applies specifically to the estimated 10,000 patients 
in the country who are in a "persistent vegetative state". It is not to be 
presumed that every patient in a persistent vegetative state is suffering 
from the same underlying pathology, but rather that they have in common 
certain clinical features of irreversible coma. The AMA statement would 
seem to be unrealistic in laying down the conditions that the accuracy of 
the diagnosis be "insured" and the coma irreversible "beyond doubt". 
Such degrees of certitude are largely unachievable through the art of 
medicine in the real world . Putting aside such uncontrollable variables and 
assuming an accurate diagnosis, an important question which arises is 
whether irreversible coma truly constitutes a fatal disease. This is pertinent 
in view of the principle applied by the Center for Health Care Ethics which 
asks "whether there is an obligation to seek to remove or circumvent a fatal 
pathology in order to prolong life". Coma, even when irreversible, does 
not constitute a uniformly fatal pathology. In the various litigated cases 
(Quinlan, Brophy, Herbert, Jobes, etc.), the comas resulted either from 
drug ingestion, anesthetic reactions or surgical catastrophes. In each 
instance, severe central nervous system damage was inflicted on the 
patient, but in no instance was a fatal pathology produced. Indeed, ifthere 
were a fatal pathology, there would have been no need for litigation. 
Decision on Life Supports 
The controversy arises when a decision has to be made regarding various 
kinds of life support for a patient who is comatose but likely to survive for 
a prolonged period or until such time as death results from a fatal event 
unrelated to the cause of the coma. If the patient were suffering from a fatal 
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pathology, feeding him or her would allow the underlying fatal process to 
run its course and end his or her life. In the usual type of persistent 
vegetative state, such an underlying fatal pathology does not charac-
teristically exist. Withholding food and nutrition over time, on the other 
hand, will have uniformly fatal results. There would be no need for an 
AMA statement if the population at issue were those patients who lapse 
into coma in the terminal stages of fatal disorders such as carcinomatosis, 
sepsis, or organ system failure. Such patients will die with or without 
feeding in a short time, usually less than a fortnight. As was the case with 
Karen Quinlan and Clarence Herbert, discontinuing respirator support 
may not result in death, especially as pulmonologists become more skilled 
at weaning certain patients off of respirators. For the patient in a persistent 
vegetative state, induced by a non-fatal cerebral insult, discontinuation of 
food and drink will terminate the coma in death from starvation. 
Three Fundamental Fallacies 
There are three fundamental fallacies in the rationale developed for the 
discontinuation of feedings in the population under discussion. The 
fallacies are 1) The allegation that the "fatal pathology" in patients with 
persistent vegetative state is the inability to swallow, 2) The interpretation 
of the discontinuation of feedings as an unwillingness to "circumvent" this 
fatal pathology, and 3) The requirement that the patient be capable of 
"cognitive-affective" function in order to pursue the purpose of life and the 
implication that a life devoid of cognitive-affective function at a certain 
unspecified level is a life unworthy to be lived. 
It is medically inaccurate to characterize the inability to swallow as a 
fatal feature of irreversible coma. Most patients in a persistent vegetative 
state, aside from a small percentage who might have bulbar paralysis, can 
swallow and do swallow most of their spontaneously produced secretions. 
They are incapable of neo-cortical functions and are therefore incapable of 
eating, an action much more complex than mere swallowing. Eating 
involves the identification of food, seeking out food and ingesting it and 
synchronizing the acts of mastication and swallowing, as well as the 
avoidance of aspiration. Many individuals capable of the act of deglutition 
will, nevertheless, have to be fed in order to survive. Infants will need to be 
fed; patients who are alert but paralyzed will have to be fed; patients with 
obstructive lesions in the upper gastrointestinal tract will require feeding 
techniques which bypass the obstruction. The patient in a persistent 
vegetative state will be incapable of numerous other basic comfort and 
self-protective functions. He will be unable to dress himself or to protect 
himself against extremes of temperature. He will be unaware of threats of 
bodily harm and will be incapable of aversive or escape movements. It 
would be inaccurate to suggest that the inability to avoid exposure is a fatal 
pathology which we bypass when we dress the comatose patient or cover 
him with blankets. If there were to be a fire in a hospice, no one would deny 
that, when the comatose terminal patients were removed, we would do so 
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as a matter of obligation, rather than as an optional circumvention of a 
potentially fatal inability to flee from danger. 
Patients in a persistent vegetative state cannot legitimately be said to be 
suffering from a fatal pathology. Feeding patients cannot be properly said 
to be treating disease or bypassing a fatal pathology. Various basic care 
measures avoid the possibility that a non-fatal incapacity become fatal. 
Food and drink sustain all persons, in or out of coma, and their 
elimination can only intend an inevitable death. 
Added Rationale 
An additional rationale must be adduced for the withholding offeedings 
from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, in the Quinlan case, cited the hopeless prognosis for a return to a 
"cognitive and sapient state." In the Center's statement, Father Kevin 
O'Rourke refers to a basic ethical assumption that there is no obligation to 
prolong life unless living "enables us to pursue the purpose of life." He 
further elucidates that "to pursue the purpose of life, one needs some 
degree of cognitive-affective function ." It is not clear what constitutes a 
sufficient degree of cognitive-affective function in a patient in order for the 
physician to incur an obligation to prolong life. What is clear is that there 
are formidable numbers of patients who have a severe compromise of 
cognitive-affective function. The AMA has identified the 10,000 patients 
in irreversible coma. There are additional large populations such as I) the 
class of patients suffering from various forms of dementia, including 
Alzheimer's disease and true senile dementia; 2) the severely mentally 
retarded population in institutions; 3) psychotic patients, particularly 
those such as schizophrenics who have grossly disordered thought 
processes and markedly blunted affect. When these three categories are 
lumped together, we are talking about hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of people. They are unquestionably alive, not dying and not 
"pursuing the purpose of life" if to do so requires cognitive affective 
function at a significant level. All of the above classes of patient require 
specific feeding strategies for their survival. Many will require artificially 
administered nutrition; most will have to be fed by others as a minimum. 
Even when de institutionalized, psychotic patients, who comprise a large 
percentage of homeless street people, will depend on the logistic provision 
of soup kitchens and public food pantries for their survival. 
The AMA refers to technologically supplied nutrition in its statement. 
The New Uniform Living Will Act, however, specifically removed the 
distinction between the withholding of naturally and artificially supplied 
nutrients, as a result of an intense lobbying effort by the Right to Die 
Society at the conference to draw up the Uniform Act. 
There is little controversy regarding patient autonomy, where a 
competent patient suffering from a fatal disease declines certain life-
prolonging therapy for good reason. There is great potential for 
controversy regarding decisions made by surrogates on behalf of 
incompetent patients. 
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Agonizing Deaths 
Starvation and dehydration lead to agonizing deaths in conscious 
patients. Is it safe to assume that such a death is without discomfort in a 
comatose patient? Probably not, although we have little testimonial 
evidence one way or another. In the recent decision in the Jobes case, the 
judge ordered tube feeding discontinued, even though attending nurses 
and two expert medical witnesses testified that Mrs. Jobes responded 
appropriately to commands to move her extremities and protrude her 
tongue. Levels of coma vary and survivors of comatose states usually attest 
to a gradual, rather than an abrupt, attainment of consciousness. In a 
recent highly publicized case, Sgt. David Mack of Minneapolis awoke 
after 22 months of coma to reveal that he had been aware of activities 
around him for about six months. 
A national policy of approval for the withholding of nutrition from a 
whole class of comatose patients would be both hazardous and premature. 
The degree to which cost-containment considerations enter into the debate 
must be accurately ascertained. The AMA would have been well advised to 
continue an active patient advocate posture at this stage of the debate. 
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